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The institutional perspective of cross-country differences in economic outcomes gives 
contrasting explanations on the persistence of extractive institutions in developing countries. 
Colonization, social fragmentation and the existence and use of natural resources are the most 
frequently discussed causes in the available literature. In this study, we analyze all the three 
explanations together by providing a case study of Nigeria. Nigeria is characterized by 
colonial legacy, social divide revealed by ethnicity and religion, and huge windfalls from oil. 
Based on our analysis, we argue that the lack and incoherence of formal institutional order is 
the main factor for Nigerian underdevelopment. Ethnic politics has shaped the formal 
institutional framework as a central stage for the disbursement of patronage and other types 
of the largesse. Colonial legacy has reinforced the effect of ethnicity by failing to provide a 
national ideology; and instead, providing a regional structure to rule. Similarly, the windfalls 
from oil have intensified the effect of ethnicity by invoking civil conflicts, arising mainly 
from the distribution of common pool. Thus, no single factor on its own can explain the 
persistence of extractive institutions; rather, it is the combination of exogenous and 
endogenous factors that collectively shape institutions.   
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1. Introduction 
The institutional perspective, blossomed recently, proclaim that capital accumulation and 
technological improvements are only the proximate causes of development. The fundamental 
determinants that influence capital accumulation and other investment decisions through 
associated incentives are institutions (North, 1990; Hall and Jones, 1999; Knack and Keefer, 
1995; Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2005; Dollar and Krray, 2003; and Rodrik et al., 2004). This 
school of thought asserts that the selection and persistent of extractive institutions is the main 
factor responsible for the existence of lower growth performances across the world. Several 
explanations, in turn, have been provided for the persistence of extractive institutions. For 
instance, colonization, social fragmentation, and the presence and use of natural resources are 
the most frequently discussed causes in the available literature.  
 In this paper we argue that no single factor on its own can explain the persistence of 
extractive institutions; rather, it is the combination of exogenous and endogenous factors that 
collectively shape institutions. We exemplify our argument with the case study of Nigeria. 
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Our analysis shows that the rent-seeking behavior of interest groups in a society results in the 
inefficiency of institutional environment which, in turn, has implications for the long run 
economic outcomes. However, this behavior is shaped by the blend of exogenous factors like 
colonial legacy and windfalls, and endogenous factors like fragmentation. The approach in 
this study is different from the earlier work in at least two aspects. First, most of the earlier 
literature on the issue provides us with a comparative analysis by using cross-country data, 
thereby ignoring the individual characteristics of economies and the context specificity of 
institutions.1 Instead, in this study, Nigeria is an important case for institutional economics 
due to its three distinguishing features: its colonization experience, its wide-spread social 
fragmentation, and its enormous natural resources windfalls. This will allow us to remove a 
large amount of the unobserved heterogeneity (e.g. cultural differences across countries) 
which is often a problem in most of the earlier research on institutions and economic 
outcomes.2  
Second, the aforesaid three features of Nigeria have collectively evolved the Nigerian 
formal institutional framework. However, the earlier cross-country research takes one of 
these features at a time and analyzes its implications for the evolution of institutions and 
economic outcomes. For instance, La Porta et al. (1999), Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) and 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) explore the influence of colonization on the evolution of institutions, 
and the consequent economic outcomes. Similarly, Mauro (1995), and Easterly and Levine 
(2001) show that ethno-linguistic fractionalization is positively associated with poor 
economic outcomes. Finally, the Natural Resource Curse hypothesis, initiated with the 
seminal work of Sachs and Warner (1997, 2001), proclaims that the countries with abundant 
natural resources are more prone to be caught by the famous Dutch Disease.
3
 Combining 
these features together, this case study would provide us with the analysis of ‘how each of the 
three affects the formal institutional framework?’ Also, it would enhance our grasp on how 
colonization, social divide, and natural resources interact in a single society or how their 
                                       
1
 According to Hodgson (2006), institutions can be understood within the specific historic, geographical, social 
context. 
 
2 Additionally, case studies collect important contextual factors (historical accidents, local norms, domestic 
economic structure, etc.) which make for a better understanding of factors influencing institutional and 
economic development.  
 
3
 Dutch Disease is a concept that explains the apparent relationship between the increase in exploitation of 
natural resources and a decline in the manufacturing sector. The mechanism is that an increase in revenues from 
natural resources will make a given nation's currency stronger compared to that of other nations, resulting in the 
nation's other exports becoming more expensive for other countries to buy, making the manufacturing sector 
less competitive. 
  
individual effects reinforce each other? The rest of the paper is organized in four sections. 
Section 2 describes the theoretical framework of the study. In section 3, we provide the 
economic, social and institutional background of Nigeria. In section 4, the main arguments of 
the paper are provided. In particular, we focus on how each of the three features, i.e. 
colonization or the ruling strategies of the British; social fragmentation; and the abundance of 
natural resources, have affected the formal institutional framework, and the consequent 
economic outcomes in Nigeria. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework    
Beginning with Hobbes, theorists have emphasized the key role of governmental coercion in 
preventing predation by private parties. However, it is quite possible that the state may itself 
be a source of predation. Mill (1848: 70) pointed out the issue in comparing “the protection 
by the government and protection against the government”.4 Alternatively, there is a trade-off 
between the social losses due to private expropriation (theft, robbery, piracy, war or disorder 
etc.) or externalities and the social losses due to state expropriations (corruption, rent-seeking 
etc.)
5
. In particular, the interaction of state with private activities creates incentives for 
interest groups to control the state in order to accrue the benefits, associated with state 
intervention (Tullock, 1967; Stigler, 1971; Krueger, 1974; Posner, 1975). Correspondingly, 
such groups invest resources in rent-seeking activities which, usually, comprise lobbying for 
influencing government decisions, campaign contributions, voting or controlling the state’s 
officials. The success of these groups generally is associated with significant costs for the 
large and poorly organized population or the overall welfare of the society. 
Most of the colonized countries are characterized by a kind of social coordination that 
is called “arbiter-client hierarchy”. During the colonial period, the administration was such 
that the coordination was secured by a third party akin to Olson’s (1965) stationary bandit. 
The colonizers in the stationary bandit, unable to extract rents by themselves, were endowed 
with a monopoly on coercion. This third party arbiter was empowered to divide the quotas on 
rents arbitrary at his own discretion; and also, he had the authority to enforce his decisions. 
Under these conditions, the colonizer was able to extort the rents collected by the other 
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 He, for instance, argued that the latter is more important because against all other predators there is a hope of 
defending oneself. 
 
5 The details of the Institutional Possibility Frontier are given in the Djankov et al. (2003). In the paper titled as 
“The New Comparative Economics”, the authors give the possible social orderings for a society ranging from 
‘Private Orderings’ to ‘Independent Judges’ to ‘Regulatory State’ to ‘State Ownership’. The authors give a 
detailed description of the social losses associated with each of these institutional structures. 
 
players or trade some of it for the political loyalty. In such a way, he acted like a landlord that 
owns the rent sources but allows his agents (clients) to take away some rents as rewards for 
bringing revenues for him. The agents, in turn, owned clients in the form of private interest 
groups. The private groups supported the agents in their revenue collecting activities; and, in 
return, they were endowed with special privileges like monopoly rights, import quotas, or 
import licenses etc. Thus, colonization provided a basis for the hierarchical structure of 
arbiter-clients in most of the colonized countries. In such arbiter-clients structures, every 
senior arbiter coordinates the rent-seeking at his level so that the lower-level arbiters are 
among his clients. Nigeria is a classic example of arbiter-clients structure where the private 
interest groups, shaped by ethnicities and languages, are clients to politicians, and the civil 
and military bureaucrats. The politicians, in turn, are ethnic elites who attract political support 
from their ethnic community. The local politicians, bureaucrats and the military officials 
serve the interests of their communities by being clients to the rulers in the federal structure. 
Given this structure, we would analyze the impact of colonization, social diversity, and 
windfalls on the Nigerian institutional and economic development. 
  
3. Economic, Social and Institutional Background of Nigeria 
Nigeria has the third biggest economy by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Africa behind 
South Africa and Egypt.6 It possesses abundant fertile land as well as substantial natural 
resources in the form of oil. Notwithstanding the abundance of natural resources, Nigeria has 
been amongst the 15 poorest nations in the World. The economy of Nigeria is highly 
concentrated in petroleum sector, making large contributions to GDP and foreign exchange 
earnings. In addition to poor economic outcomes, it is characterized by enormous social 
problems ranging from mass illiteracy of adult population and gender disparities in education 
to severe issues like civil conflicts arising from ethno-linguistic and religious fragmentation. 
Likewise, it is characterized by failed institutions with authoritarian structure since the 
colonial times. 
Nigeria’s per capital GDP, in constant 2000 US $ terms, was on average $293.48 in 
the first half of 1960s, and is estimated to have remained at $365.27 in the 1990s. This is 24.5 
percent increase in 40 years, showing a dismal economic performance during the course of 
the period.
7
 Besides, the growth rate in Nigeria is characterized by volatility. From the 
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7
 See table 1 in the appendix for details. 
beginning to the times of oil price hikes, growth rate in per capita GDP was averaging around 
2.4 percent. However, it became negative after the sudden slump in oil prices in the first half 
of 1980s, showing bubbles caused by the windfalls from oil. Similarly, after the failure of 
Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), the repayment of external debts and severe political 
instability, the growth rate exhibited to be less than 0.1 percent in 1990s.
8
 Concurrently, in 
constant 2000 US $ terms, from 1970 to 2009, Nigeria’s cumulative revenues from oil (after 
deducting the payments to the foreign oil companies) have amounted to about $480 billion 
(see table 4 for the details of oil revenue). In 1970, oil revenue per capita was about $11 that 
led to $155.6 in 2000 in constant 2000 US $ terms, showing almost 1300 percent increase 
during the period.  The only 24.5 percent increase in per capita GDP compared to 1300 
percent increase in oil revenues demonstrates that the oil revenues did not seem to add to the 
standard of living at all. The result is significant amount of poverty with inequality. For 
instance, based on the definition of population subsisting on less than $1.25 per day, the 
poverty rate increased from 36 percent in 1960s to almost 69 percent in 2000.9  
Likewise, Nigeria is amongst the countries with the lowest life expectancy. Its life 
expectancy was roughly 40 years in the 1965 but remained at around 50 years in 2010 which 
is smaller than that of the comparable developing countries. For 2010, with the Human 
Development Index (HDI) of 0.44, Nigeria is ranked 156
th
 of 187 countries. The time series 
trends in HDI show that Nigeria has so far been unable to outperform the average 
development of sub-Saharan countries (UNDP, 2011). The income inequality is higher, and is 
increasing further overtime. For instance, the Gini index was around 39 percent in the first 
half of 1980s and it rose to 43.38 percent in 2005. Besides these major indicators, Nigeria is a 
country with higher infant mortality rates and higher birth rates. The fertility rate of around 6 
per woman is higher for a country which is characterized by poor manufacturing base and 
higher concentration of the economy around natural resources. The public spending on 
education and health is cumulatively less than 5 percent of GDP. Like growth rate, the public 
expenditures on social services are volatile. For example, the public spending on education 
was above 3 percent of GDP at the times of windfalls but it declined to less than 1 percent 
after the slump in oil prices. 
                                       
8 The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was an economic reform programme, conducted by the 
international financial institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), with a set of 
policies centered on devaluation. It originated due to a series of global economic disasters during the late 1970s: 
the oil crisis, debt crisis, multiple economic depressions and stagflation. 
 
9 This translates into an increase in the number of poor from about 19 million in 1970 to a staggering 90 million 
in 2000 (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003).  
 
Politics in Nigeria is based on patronage, clientalism, rent-seeking, and ethnic 
cooperation (Lewis, 2007). The inability of the state to establish credible commitment, in 
turn, has vitiated economic policy and undermined capital formation. Nigeria has been under 
military rule for 30 years out of its 55 years history. Besides its volatile political stability, its 
history of political succession is threatening. It has experienced six successful coups, 
numerous failed attempts, and only two abortive democratic regimes in the first 40 years. 
This centrally illustrates the problems of institutional development in Nigeria.10 The 
comparative analysis of the institutional quality indices, summarized in table 3 in the 
appendix, further enriches this evidence. The indices of the World Bank which estimates 
various aspects of the governance are divided into six broad categories. The indices, ranging 
from -2.5 to +2.5, score Nigeria in their lowest ranking. Averaging all the six indicators, 
Nigeria is scored less than -1 since 1996 to 2008.  Thus, based on the definitions of the World 
Bank, Nigeria is characterized by weak government effectiveness, poor regulatory quality 
and rule of law, political instability, pervasive corruption and the lack of voice and 
accountability. Besides World Bank, the Transparency International has persistently rated 
Nigeria amongst the most corrupt nations in the world. Based on their Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI), Nigeria was the most corruption nation out of 54 nations in 1996. Similarly, it is 
categorized as 143
rd 
corrupt country out 182 countries in 2010. In terms of economic 
freedom, the Heritage Foundation characterizes Nigeria with limited freedom in investment 
and financial sectors and poor property rights protection. Based on this comparative analysis, 
we state that corruption, rent-seeking and predatory rule have degenerated the state 
capabilities and essential institutions. Alternatively, the prevailing institutional framework 
that has not led to the alleviation of transaction costs has ruinous consequences for long run 
economic outcomes. 
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 4. Evidence on Colonization, Ethnicity, Windfalls, Institutions and Economic 
Development 
 
In this section, we explore the interaction between the three features of Nigeria in terms of 
institutional and economic development. Firstly, we provide separate critical analysis of each 
of the three features. Onwards, we provide a combined interaction among them for the overall 
structure of Nigeria. 
 
4.1.Colonial Legacy and Nigerian Institutions 
Colonization is regarded as an historical natural experiment in which there occurred 
substantial transformation of institutions in the colonized countries (Seilder, 2011). 
Alternatively, in most of the independent colonized countries, the origins of the existing 
institutional framework can be traced back to the colonial periods. There are three different 
lines of research which see the impact of colonization on the indigenous institutions. 
According to Engerman & Sokoloff (2000), the interaction of factor endowments with 
colonial rule created different levels of inequality in different societies. Thus, in societies 
founded with greater inequality, the elites gained more power to influence the choice of legal 
and economic institutions which, in turn, have implications for growth. Likewise, Acemoglu 
et al. (2001) argued that the choice of colonial institutions depended on settler mortality rates 
in the colonies.11 In other words, the dangerous zones in terms of settler mortality rates were 
expected to have extractive colonial institutions. In a related study, Acemoglu et al. (2002) 
maintained that Europeans introduced extractive institutions in prosperous and densely settled 
areas.12 Characterized by path-dependence, the colonial institutions persisted still in the 
independent countries which, in turn, explain the cross-country differences in the growth 
performance. The third line of research is based on the legal traditions of different colonial 
powers (North, 1990; La Porta et al., 1999; and Djankov et al., 2003). North (1990) considers 
the different ideologies of the Spanish and British colonialists and argues that British colonial 
institutions – characterized by freedom from expropriation and preference for trade – have 
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 In places where Europeans faced high mortality rates; they could not settle there and were more likely to set 
up extractive institutions. In contrast, in places where European faced low mortality rates; they settled there, and 
adopted institutions that could protect property rights and enforce contracts efficiently. 
 
12 For instance, the colonial power exploited the existing native institutions in the prosperous and densely 
populated colonies to force the local population to work in mines and plantations. In contrast, in sparsely settled 
areas, Europeans settled in large numbers and created institutions of private property, providing secure property 
rights to a broad cross section of the society and encouraging commerce and industry.     
 
been central to economic development. Similarly, La Porta et al. (1999) as well as Djankov et 
al. (2003) conclude that the legal origins of the British Common Law are more prone to 
protect property rights as compared to the French Civil law. Consequently, the British 
colonies experience good institutional framework relative to those of the French. 
 British control over today’s Nigeria started from the colonization of the settlement of 
Lagos in 1861. Later, from 1886 to 1900 the Royal Niger Company controlled the central 
Nigeria. Subsequently, its territories were amalgamated into the new Protectorate of Southern 
Nigeria. In 1906 the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria was merged with the Lagos 
Protectorate (Coleman 1971, p. 41-44). In 1900, it had started to extend its rule to the North 
of Nigeria by establishing the Northern Protectorate in January, 1900. Frederick Lugard, the 
first High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria, negotiated with the local emirs to accept the 
colonial rule. Most of them cooperated and the rest were defeated from Bida in 1901 to 
Sokoto in 1903. Finally, in 1914, the British united the coastal colony of Lagos with their 
protectorates of Southern and Northern Nigeria to form the present territorial shape of 
Nigeria.
13 
 Onwards 1900 to Independence, the British applied the policy of indirect rule, 
especially in the Northern Nigeria. In particular, they restructured the local authorities and 
institutions and deposed those office holders who resisted. This policy created a compliant 
local power that furthered the interests of the British. Also, this policy was successful in 
avoiding any direct disruption of the region’s social structures, including its dominant 
religion and culture.14 Local rulers were used to control the populace and raise revenue but 
were supervised by British officials who could veto their decisions.
15
 The administrative set 
up was centralized and hierarchical as all personnel remain unquestionably subordinate to top 
(colonial) authority.
16
 This patron-client type of hierarchical structure was characterized by 
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 At the time of amalgamation a certain degree of administrative distinction between the Southern and Northern 
Nigeria was maintained (Crowder 1978a, p. 191). This reflected the enormous cultural differences of the ethnic 
groups which had been artificially united in one territory.  
 
14
 In reality, the policy of indirect rule had been created out of the necessity to rule a large and fragmented 
population with a minimum of resources. 
 
15
 According to Seidler (2011), only the treasury, railways, judiciary, military and post and telegraphs were 
managed centrally by Frederick Lugard who was appointed the first Governor-General of combined Nigeria in 
1914. Most other things and day-to-day business was effectively regionalized in the hands of Lugard’s two 
Lieutenant-Generals (one for the North and one for the South). Even working languages differed. The Northern 
administration used widely common Hausa whereas the South used English. 
 
16
 Duke II (2010) provides a basic structure of hierarchy, starting from High Commissioner and his two 
executive lieutenants. After these centralized authorities, comes the resident, divisional and district officers. The 
tidiness and order in the work place; however, it destructively disrupted personal initiatives, 
creative thinking and innovation among the local people. Due to the colonial policy of cost 
minimization, little resources were allocated for the development of human capital. This 
resulted in the eventual creation of a workforce only good enough to carry out routine and 
non-creative tasks.
17
 Moreover, a large part of the creation of a professional bureaucracy in 
Nigeria came from the need to collect taxes in the colonial period. This led to the 
authoritative behavior on the part of the state officials which was one of the major 
consequences of hierarchical structure applied during the colonial period. 
 The economic structure of British rule in Nigeria constituted a classic open economy 
characterized by the exportation of agricultural commodities and solid minerals, and the 
importation of foreign manufactured goods. The trade in major commodities was officially 
regulated; and the focus was on international trade as state revenue mainly derived from the 
taxes on trade. Consequently, domestic markets developed mainly in areas which were off the 
international linkages and exports centers. This set up combined with the earlier agrarian 
structure of Nigeria resulted in subsistence farming during the colonial period. Commercial 
production was carried out only for exports; and it was carried out in those sectors which 
were of interests to British business firms. As a result, no genuine effort was made towards 
developing the technical and managerial capacity of local farmers beyond that of being mere 
producers of primary raw materials. Also, this policy limited the development of 
manufacturing sector, confining it to labor-intensive and light consumer goods for domestic 
consumption.  
 Despite the policy of indirect rule, the colonial rule introduced significant political, 
judicial and cultural changes. For instance, it was the Britain who initiated the federal 
structure in Nigeria. The regional divide into Northern, South Eastern and South Western 
parts of Nigeria laid out a roadmap for self-rule. The regions were granted autonomy over 
internal policy and administration, while the central colonial power retained authority over 
interregional policy and external affairs. Subsequently, the 1957 constitutional settlement, 
which the British had negotiated with nationalists, allotted representation in the federal 
                                                                                                                       
local content of the administration included native political agents, warrant chiefs, clerks, messengers and 
constables, who were merely subordinate field executors of colonial policies and decisions of the top hierarchy. 
 
17
 The core of the educational policy of colonization was to produce a literate, but junior clerical and mid-level 
manpower cadre fit to work at government offices, trading companies and sub-tertiary educational institutions. 
This meant that the authorities spent limited resources on the creation and development of educational 
institutions that would normally produce a workforce equipped with high level technical, innovative and 
managerial skills. 
 
legislature on the basis of regional population. This provided the Northern region with an 
edge in the parliamentary system because it had 53 percent of the population according to a 
1952 census. This arrangement was, further, ratified in the 1959 transitional elections, in 
which the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) maintained a commanding position. However, 
the division of administration into three region structure and the consequent domination of 
center by the Northerners proved to be the main cause of subsequent regional conflicts. In 
other words, it proved to be the basis for ethnic politics in the independent Nigeria. Instead, 
the British could provide Nigeria with a national ideology because national ideologies have 
often proven to be successful in mitigating regional or ethnic cleavages. 
 
4.2. Ethnic Fragmentation, Biafra War and Institutions   
There is considerable literature on the implications of ethno-linguistic fragmentation for 
institutional and economic development. Mauro (1995), using ethno-linguistic fragmentation 
as an instrument for corruption, argued that ethno-linguistic fragmentation matters for 
government activities and economic outcomes. Likewise, Easterly and Levine (1997) have 
shown that per capita GDP growth is inversely related to ethno-linguistic fractionalization.18 
La Porta et al. (1999) established an inverse relationship between ethno-linguistic 
fragmentation and the quality of institutions. It has also been shown that ethnic diversity 
affects the incidence of civil wars (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005b). Such institutional 
explanation of ethnicity gives three channels, i.e. political instability, rent-seeking policies 
and generalized corruption, and under provision of public goods, through which ethnicity can 
affect economic outcomes (Mauro, 1995; Easterly and Levine, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; 
Alesina et al., 2003; and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005a).  
 The evolution of ethnic identities or regional cleavages in Nigeria can be traced back 
to structures consolidated by the colonialists in the process of combining Nigeria. In 
particular, the cleavages strengthened with the introduction of a three-region administrative 
structure (the North, the South East, and the South West) in 1947. Since then, ethnicity has 
dominated the other sources of de facto power in the process of politics and public 
administration. Nigeria comprises more than 250 ethnic groups, sharing the same country. 
However, the dominance of the three major groups has been intact in their respective regions 
throughout the Nigerian history. The regional division of these groups is such that the Hausa-
Fulani (29 percent) predominate in the north; the Nupe and Tiv are in the middle regions; the 
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 In particular, they argued that much of Africa’s growth failure is due to ethnic conflict partly as a result of the 
absurd borders left by the former colonizers. 
Yoruba (21 percent) is in the southwest; and the Ibo (Igbo) (18 percent) reside in the 
southeast. The other important minority groups that are politically salient are the Ijaw (10 
percent) Kanuri (4.0 percent), Ibibio (3.5 percent), and Tiv (2.5 percent). Besides ethnicity, 
the North-South divide is also amplified by the religious divide. For instance, the far north is 
primarily Muslim and south contains a large number of Christians. Given this diversity, the 
population speaks close to 400 different languages and dialects. 
 Furthermore, the politically salient groups are characterized by different economic 
interests and endowments since the colonial times. For instance, the South was highly 
educated and urbanized due to their earlier acceptance of the British education system and 
other institutions. Additionally, their per capita income was augmented by their access to 
major centers of commerce and international linkages. In contrast, the northern parts were 
relatively under developed, and were isolated due to their traditional emirate rule. Thus, 
Nigeria got independence with this uneven level of development.
19
 However, the comparative 
advantage of the Northerners due to the 1957 constitutional settlement and their large 
population paralleled their earlier disadvantage in education and economic position. Given 
this advantage, the Northerners have dominated the central government since independence.
20
  
 In the First Republic (October, 1960-January, 1966), the Hausa-Fulani’s Northern 
People Congress (NPC) made a coalition government with the Igbo National Council of 
Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) while the Yoruba party, Action Groups (AG) was in 
opposition. However, the coalition government did not work due to the specific political 
agenda that the Northerners had, based on their ethnicity and religion. For instance, the 
Northerners wanted to forge northern unity and restore the heritage of caliphate. Thus, the 
marginalization of and discrimination against the eastern Igbos resulted in a revolt by the 
Christian Igbo officers which ended in a coup in January, 1966.21 However, this was followed 
by a counter-coup in July, 1966 by the Northerners that resulted in the mass killings of 
southeasterners, mostly Igbos. The discontent, enhanced by ethnic competition, was 
manifested in Biafra Civil war (May, 1967 to January, 1970) in which the communities in 
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  Suberu (2001) demonstrates this fact by showing that in the quota system of Nigeria; the students from the 
North have been accepted to the university at the expense of qualified students from the South. 
 
20
 Collier (1996) quotes that the north needs to control the government in order to offset the large commercial 
advantages of the south in both export resources and education. This is based on the premise that the central 
government in Nigeria is center stage for distributing the pool of resources.  
 
21
 In the coup, Ahmadu Bello, the chief of NPC and several northern political and military leaders were killed. 
south-eastern Nigeria, dominated by Igbo, declared itself as the Republic of Biafra.
22
 The war 
was mostly fought in the eastern regions, and it was concluded in favour of the Nigerian state. 
However, besides the human losses of more than 1 million, the Biafra war had long lasting 
effects on the inter-group relations, the institutional structure and the path of economic 
change (Okonta and Meagher, 2009). For instance, it reinforced the perception of the military 
as a means for maintaining the North’s dominance in the federation.  
 Second, it intensified further the salience of ethnicity in the political process by 
raising demands for states creation. The break-up of Nigeria into twelve states in 1967 
created new elites in the new states. The regional distributional demands increased further 
which, in a setting of weak formal institutions, created a social dilemma: individuals and 
regional groups focused on particular gains at the expense of collective goods and general 
welfare. The federal structure commonly strived to address the regional and ethnic demands 
through informal strategies. For instance, the informal dispensations and the bargaining 
among the various interests groups were the most often used instruments. In the same way, 
political consolidation was sought through some form of multiethnic coalitions. This type of 
distributional politics has reinforced a particular path of institutional development in Nigeria 
characterized by high levels of political discretion, a low salience of formal institutions, and 
widespread pressures on state for preferential benefits. Nigeria’s poor economic performance 
is linked to this central problem of collective action. 
 
4.3.Oil Revenue, Rent-Seeking and Dutch Disease 
Empirical research on the implications of natural resources started to arise with the seminal 
findings of Sachs and Warner (1997, 1999, and 2001). Most of the earlier research gives the 
explanation incorporated in the Dutch Disease, i.e. the windfalls crowd out the manufacturing 
sector.
23
 However, with the blossom of the institutional perspective of economic 
development, the interests in the institutional implications of natural resources also took 
surge (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003). Two views emerge from this strand of 
literature. First, the abundance of natural resources increases corruption and rent-seeking 
                                       
22
 The nation of Biafra, declared by Odumegwu Ojukwu in 1967, comprised some of the communities in south-
eastern Nigeria, the most dominant being Igbo. The ensuing war lasted from May, 1967 to January, 1970. The 
Biafra Civil War raised the question about ownership of the oil for the first time. The Eastern region claimed 
that the rent and royalties from the oil companies should be paid to the newly declared Republic of Biafra, while 
the Government of Nigeria argued that the revenues belonged to them. 
 
23
 Dalgaard and Olsson (2008) provide us with a detail survey of the most of the earlier research on natural 
resources curse. 
  
(Leite and Weidmann, 1999; Khan, 1994; Tornell and Lane, 1999; Torvik, 2002). Second, the 
availability and distribution of natural resources increases the possibility of civil wars (Collier 
and Hoeffler, 1998; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; De Soysa, 2002; Ross, 2001). Both of these 
views can be regarded as relevant in Nigeria. For instance, the Biafra war was partly arose 
due to the competition between the Northerners and the South-Easterners for resources. 
Similarly, corruption and rent-seeking is highly manifested in the populist measures taken 
during the windfall periods.24 
  At the time of oil discovery in 1956, Nigeria was a low-income agrarian economy 
specializing in primary agricultural commodities like coca, palm produce, ground nuts and 
rubber. In the initial years, Nigeria was exporting oil but its contribution to exports earnings 
was minimal. Similarly, the Nigerian federal government had only limited involvement in the 
oil industry, comprising only to taxes and royalties on the oil companies. However, following 
the Biafra War which was considered by many as an attempt by the easterners to get access to 
the oil revenue, the government under the leadership of Yakubu Gowon nationalized the oil 
industry in 1971. Subsequently, the importance of oil increased significantly with two 
successive oil price hikes in the 1970s (1973 and 1979), making Nigeria one of the giants in 
the oil industry. Since then, the economy of Nigeria is oil based, locating Nigeria as the sixth 
largest oil exporter. In terms of oil production, Nigeria is presently the world’s 14th largest 
producer of crude oil, producing roughly 2.2 million barrels per day and it has the 10
th
 largest 
oil reserves in the world (CIA, Factbook). In 1970, oil revenue was a mere $250 million but 
after the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) embargo and price hikes 
following the Middle Eastern Yom Kippur war in 1973, revenues sprang from $2.1 billion in 
1972 to $11.2 billion by 1974. These windfalls have led to the high concentration of Nigerian 
economy into petroleum sector.  
 A glance at table 4 will show the prominence of oil to exports earnings and 
government revenue. Since the first oil price shock (1973) to present, oil is contributing more 
than 30 percent to GDP, and is providing more than 70 percent of the government revenue. 
For instance, the percentage share of oil to government revenue abruptly increased from just 
5 percent in the 1960s to almost 70 percent in the 1970s. Similarly, fuel exports as percent of 
total merchandised exports was around 25 percent in the 1960s. The oil price shock led it to 
almost 90 percent in the 1970s. Again, in most of the Nigerian history after the oil price 
shocks, oil is the major contributing unit to total exports, making more than 95 percent of 
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 For example, during the windfalls years, the Nigerian leaders adopted policies like price controls, subsidies, 
burgeoning public employment, extensive social provisions, protection and assistance for local entrepreneurs, 
expensive fiscal and monetary policies, and increased borrowing (Lewis, 2007). 
exports earnings. Apart from its economic importance, oil is also playing significant role in 
the dynamics of politics in Nigeria. For instance, the federal government redistributes a 
significant share of the oil revenues to Nigeria’s 36 states and 776 local governments (Bach, 
2006).25 Most of the Nigerian states have no independent source of revenue; and, thereby, 
they are reliant on the federation in order to main their current as well as development 
expenditure. Since, the central government has been formed by multi-ethnic coalitions 
throughout the Nigerian history; so, it has been merely a stage for the collection and 
distribution of oil revenues. Ethnic groups with more bargaining power obtain the greater 
share of this national treasure. This type of distributional conflict has resulted in frequent 
changes in the revenue sharing formula. As can be seen in table 5, it has been adjusted 
frequently to meet the regional demands at various times. Second, though the share of federal 
government decreased from 70 per cent in 1960s to around 50 per cent in 2000 but still 50 per 
cent of the total revenue is enough to invoke ethnic conflicts in a federation like Nigeria. 
 





Oil Revenue ($ 
Million) 
Oil rents (% of 
GDP) 
Total natural 
resources rents (% 
of GDP) 







1961-65 674.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.15 
1966-70 903.48 46.65 3.25 4.46 5.16 36.62 
1971-75 4501.87 3253.99 17.97 19.33 72.28 85.52 
1976-80 16160.46 11148.77 33.15 34.34 68.99 93.19 
1981-85 16903.99 11698.21 35.68 37.91 69.20 95.83 
1986-90 7820.11 5597.20 32.67 36.38 71.57 94.24 
1991-95 12025.10 9455.85 36.32 41.16 78.63 96.63 
1996-00 20152.16 15207.68 33.22 37.03 75.46 97.48 
2001-05 25222.85 20626.99 31.60 36.62 81.78 97.20 
2006-08 52710.35 43887.74 31.32 36.85 83.26 93.50 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank; Ministry of Finance, Government of Nigeria; Central 
Bank of Nigeria. 
** The Values are taken as average for the corresponding period. So all the values are showing values per 
annum, on average. 
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 The distribution of Oil revenue is undertaken by the federal government since the nationalization of oil sector 
in 1971. Most of these states and local government entities rely heavily on this source of income. 
   
 
Table 5: Nigeria's Division of Distributable Pool Account Revenue  (as % of total) 
Receipients 1960-1962 1963-1966 1981 Act. 1984 1990 Jun. 1992 2002-To Date 
Federal Government 70 65 55 55 50 48.5 52.68 
State Government 30 35 30.5 32.5 30 24 26.72 
Local Government   10 10 15 20 20.6 
Special Funds**   4.5 2.5 5 7.5  
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Salami (2011) 
** Special Funds include recipients like development of oil producing areas, federal capital territory etc. 
 
 
 Similarly, the analysis of Nigerian public expenditure after the oil price shocks is 
shown in figure 2 and is summarized in details in table 6 in the appendix. In the figure, it is 
evident that during the oil boom period, total expenditure as well as capital expenditure 
increased significantly. For instance, in the whole 1960s, on average, total government 
expenditure was around 3% of GDP per annum; however, with the oil price shocks, it 
suddenly increased to 35% of GDP in 1970s and 40% in 1980s. Another significant feature of 
this increase is that the capital expenditure increased from less than 1% of GDP per annum in 
the 1960s to around 20% of GDP in 1970s and 19% in the 1980s. After the oil slump in the 
1980s, the total expenditure suddenly decreased from around 58% of GDP per annum in the 
first half of 1980s to 22% of GDP per annum in the second half. Correspondingly, capital 
expenditure decreased from 29% of GDP per annum in the first half of 1980s to around 8% 
of GDP per annum in the second half. This is the indication of the fact that the surge in public 
expenditure was caused by the hike in oil prices. 
   
  
   
Nigerian capital stock grew at an average of 14 percent per year from 1973 to 1980. 
Despite this growth, the Nigerian over-investment in physical capital suffered from poor 
productivity (Collier, 1996; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003).26 The rise in public 
expenditure was an attempt by the actors involved in the federal structure to create and seize 
the rents in terms of corruption and kickbacks on contracts. The major example is financing 
the steel industry in the 1970s with the oil revenues. For instance, the building of the famous 
Ajakouta steel complex in the 1970s costed $8 billion, which until today has not produced a 
commercial ton of steel. In the same way, other steel mills in Nigeria produce only 
sporadically and also, at a loss. It indicates that the government made a bad choice when it 
spent part of the oil windfall on building a steel industry. Likewise, in 1978, the civilian 
government recalled a contract for a dam which had been awarded at the price of $120 
million and re-awarded it at the astonishingly inflated cost of $600 million (Bevan et al., 
1999). Thus, major portion of the resources windfalls, thus, went into the outlets of rents 
which were created by the proliferation of state-owned enterprises, the expansion of contracts 
and procurements, and the establishment of subsidies on services and basic commodities. The 
capital projects in the public sector increased the discretionary funds of bureaucrats which 
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 Collier (1996) points out that although public capital formation in Nigeria has been higher relative to most 



































Figure 2: Analysis of Nigerian Public Expenditure Vs Crude Oil Prices 
average Annual Prices of crude oil Inflation Adjusted($ per barrel)
Total Expendtire ($ Hundered Million)
Recurrent Expenditure ( $ Hundred Million)
Source: US Energy Information Administration, Ministry of Finance, Government of Nigeria. 
combined with the absence of fiscal oversight encouraged public officials to regard their 
offices as sinecures for extracting state resources. Second, it also resulted in the increased 
lobbying of interest groups over the location and control of these projects. Thus, politicians 
and civil servants were widely involved in business activities which blurred the distinction 
between the government and the private interests. In a sense, accumulation was structured 
around the collusion between businesses and state elites. 
 
4.4. The Interaction between Colonization, Ethnicity and Windfall Rents   
In this section, we propose how colonization, ethnicity and the oil rents interacted in the 
institutional and economic development of Nigeria. The proposed interaction is summarized 
in figure 3. The first and most important factor that shapes Nigerian institutions is its social 
divide. Ethic politics in Nigeria is a struggle among fixed identity groups who contend over 
scarce resources (Nnoli, 1978; 1995). Alternatively, ethnicity serves is a central avenue for 
collective action in terms of political organization and participation. The resulting political 
structure has an ethnic character: the ethnic political parties shape the civilian governments; 
likewise, the military regimes reflect a clear sectional ruling group. In such a structure, rules 
have never been followed in the distributive contest among the various groups. Instead, the 
groups with power have been winning the contest. It is well-established that politics, shaped 
by ethnicity, result in the instability of operating institutional framework (Diamond et al., 
1995).
27
   
Likewise, the colonial legacy has three impacts on the Nigerian structure. First, during 
the colonial times, the British officials were involved down to district level. The local 
suzerains were paid a fixed income out of the tax revenues they collected for the British. The 
administration, based on hierarchy, was an authoritarian one which became the basis of 
subsequent bureaucratic structure in independent Nigeria. Consequently, Public officials in 
Nigeria have been ruling instead of serving. Second, the colonial trade structure, ensuring the 
business interests of the British firms, was established in such a way that Nigeria could only 
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 Diamond et al. (1995) argue, the majoritarian principle is problematic in plural societies because ethnic 
parties that lose elections tend to reject not only the election results but also the whole gamut of democratic 








export raw materials and import manufacturing goods. Alternatively, British were little 
interested in the manufacturing sector of Nigeria which paved the way for a lower 
manufacturing base of independent Nigeria. Third, the colonial legacy-far from narrowing the 
differences between the peoples and providing a national coherent ideology- actually 
widened and deepened these differences. For instance, the British persisted with regional 
administrative units based on ethnicity: Hausa-Fulani in the North, Igbo in the South East, 
and Yoruba in the South West. This policy not only enhanced the ethnic competition between 
these three dominant groups, but; it also caused a feeling of marginalization in the other 
smaller groups. As a byproduct, it led to wide differences in the regions in terms of 
education, modernization and economic outcomes. 
   
 
 Similarly, windfalls have three effects on the Nigerian institutions and economic 
outcomes. First, the static effect was the increase in public expenditure during the windfalls 
years which contributed to the higher growth rates during that period. The other two effects 
are dynamic. First, it enlarged the effects of ethnicity by enhancing ethnic competition over 
the fixed bounty. The distributional politics, in turn, has weakened the Nigerian formal 
structure. In particular, the distributional conflict makes the allocation function more 
complex, i.e. the expenditures are undertaken by the state governments while the sources of 
finance are centrally-collected. Second, it resulted in the increased corruption and kickbacks 
on contracts. For instance, the windfalls expanded the role of state which, in turn, opened 
opportunities for unbridled corruption and profligacy in the process of national spending on 
industrialization and infrastructure projects. Entrepreneurs secured rents by colliding with 
public officials and exploiting many opportunities for arbitrage or fraud. However, in the end, 
the expansion in state activities could not develop an efficient manufacturing base. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this study, we have endeavored to explain the interaction between extractive institutional 
structure and economic outcomes by providing evidence from Nigeria. After independence, 
Nigeria was expected to have potential for higher development due to its larger human and 
natural resources. But unfortunately, after five decades, the performance in terms of social 
and economic indicators is dismal. Nigeria is characterized by colonial heritage, ethnic and 
religious diversity, windfalls in the form of oil revenue, extractive institutional framework 
and poor economic outcomes. The main proximate factors that can explain the Nigerian 
under-development are Nigeria’s over-dependence on some primary products and the 
petroleum sector throughout its history. Since 1961 to 2008, Nigerian state spent almost $200 
billion in capital formation but still it could not diversify its economy from its high 
concentration on petroleum sector to manufacturing. However, the extractive institutional 
structure is the fundamental cause leading this higher concentration on oil and lower 
manufacturing base.  
Nigeria’s formal institutional structure has evolved under the influence of three 
factors: colonial legacy, social fragmentation and windfalls from oil. The ruling strategies, 
ranging from colonial times to independent Nigeria, have been non-ideological, non-
participatory, and have been mainly comprised rent-seeking policies. Social diversity has 
been vehemently used in politics by all the rulers including colonizers, military and the 
civilian ones. Thus, ethnic, regional and religious antipathies were spurred by group 
perception of inequality and competition over public patronage. Corruption, short-sightedness 
and prebendalism were the outcomes that arose from such contentious distributional politics. 
The collusion among military officials, politicians, bureaucrats, and business cronies gave 
rise to convergence of interests around the emerging rentier state and politically regulated 
markets. As a result, the huge windfalls resulting from oil prices hike could not be managed 
in a manner to promote growth and benefit society at large. Instead, it steered to state-
oriented expenditure bonanza which led to increased rent-seeking and kick-backs on 
contracts. The patronage system has shaped Nigerian politics and institutions 
individuals/groups-centered rather than welfare-oriented.  
 In this study, we have found that Nigeria ended up with poor economic and social 
outcomes due to its extractive institutional framework. Second, focusing on the three 
foundations of the Nigerian institutions, we have found that no single factor can explains the 
persistence of extractive institutions in Nigeria on its own. Instead, it is the combination of 
colonial legacy, ethnic-linguistic fragmentation and windfalls that have contributed to rent-
seeking, extractive formal structure, and poor economic outcomes. Thus, more case studies 
need to be carried out in order to draw some general propositions about the theories 
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Table 1: Major Economic and Social Indicators of Nigeria 


























































1961-65 293.48 2.29   39.61  164.10  6.34    
1966-70 278.90 3.21   41.54  153.32  6.40  36.01  
1971-75 400.56 3.13   43.54 3.07 142.41  6.62    
1976-80 416.00 1.02   45.50 3.60 131.91  6.77    
1981-85 323.66 -5.20   45.90 1.40 125.24  6.74 76.96 53.93 38.68 
1986-90 328.21 2.76   45.60 0.86 125.20  6.52    
1991-95 364.06 0.06 54.44 1.13 45.10 0.80 125.30  6.21 69.71 49.19 44.95 
1996-00 366.48 0.07  1.32 46.30  116.48  5.97 86.44 68.51 46.50 
2001-05 403.47 3.62 54.77 1.71 49.00  104.38 0.43 5.77 77.70 57.21 43.38 
2006-10 496.26 4.06 61.00 1.78 50.48  92.70 0.44 5.61    
Source: World Development Indicators, the World Bank; Human Development Report, United Nations Development 
Programme 
Note: The value is taken as the simple average for the corresponding five years, depending on the availability of data.  
 
 
Table 2: History of Nigerian Rulers by Regime Type (1960-2010) 
1960 Independence 
1960-66 Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (Civilian Government of Northern People’s Congress (NPC)) 
1966 J.T.U Aguiyi Ironsi (Military Government which Came Through a Coup after the murder of 
Abubakar) 
1966-75 Yakubu Gowon (Military Government which initiated with a Counter-Coup in which J.T.U 
Aguiyi Ironsi was killed) 
1975-76 
 












Muhamddu Buhari (Military) (1983-85), Ibrahim Babangida (Military) (1985-93), Ernes 
Shonekan (Civilian) (1993), Sani Abacha (Military) (1993-98), Abdulsalami Abubakar 
(Military) (1998-99) 
 
1999-2010 Civilian (People’s Democratic Party), Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007) Umaru Yar’Adua 
(2007-2010) 




















(% of GDP) 
Recurrent 
Expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
Capital 
Expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
         
1961-65 272.06 173.83 98.23 14409.29 1.89 1.21 0.68 
1966-70 650.48 479.44 171.04 15321.47 4.25 3.13 1.12 
1971-75 3990.21 2201.79 1788.42 24789.29 16.10 8.88 7.21 
1976-80 15691.25 6097.10 9594.15 29640.73 52.94 20.57 32.37 
1981-85 15405.37 7731.89 7673.48 26385.03 58.39 29.30 29.08 
1986-90 6782.82 4119.26 2663.56 30507.37 22.23 13.50 8.73 
1991-95 7885.32 4608.24 3277.09 38202.56 20.64 12.06 8.58 
1996-00 14877.68 6095.95 8781.73 43272.84 34.38 14.09 20.29 
2001-05 10339.20 7139.38 3199.82 53857.65 19.20 13.26 5.94 
2006-08 20627.75 13507.41 7120.34 69966.83 29.48 19.31 10.18 
 Sources: World Development Indicator, World Bank; Federal Ministry of Finance, Government of Nigeria; and Central 
Bank of Nigeria. 










Figure 1: Ethnic Groups as Percentage of Population 
Hausa-Fulani Yoruba Igbo Ijaw Kanuri Ibibio Tiv Others
Source: CIA Factbook, 2010. 
 Table 3:  Comparative Institutional Indices Profile of Nigeria 
World Bank*  Years 
Description of Variables (Based on Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi; 2007) Index Name 1996 2000 2008 
Government 
Effectiveness -1.35 -1.06 -0.98 
It combines into a single grouping responses on the quality of public service provision, 
the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of 
the civil service from political pressures, and the Credibility of the government’s 
commitment to policies.  
Regulatory 
Quality -1.13 -0.67 -0.62 
“Regulatory Quality” includes measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies 
such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the 
burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business 
development. 
Rule of Law -1.42 -1.14 -1.12 
“Rule of Law” includes several indicators which measure the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the 
incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the 
enforceability of contracts. It measures that fair and predictable rules form the basis for 
economic and social interactions and the extent to which property rights are protected. 
Control of 
Corruption -1.26 -1.25 -0.92 
The particular aspect of corruption measured by the various sources differs somewhat, 
ranging from the frequency of “additional payments to get things done”, to the effects 
of corruption on the business environment, to measuring “grand corruption” in the 
political arena or in the tendency of elite forms to engage in “state capture”. 
Political 
Stability -1.60 -1.63 -2.00 
“Political Stability” combines several indicators which measure perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly 
unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism. 
Voice and 
Accountability -1.80 -0.72 -0.60 
“Voice and Accountability” includes a number of indicators measuring various aspects 
of the political process, civil liberties and political rights. These indicators measure the 
extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of 
governments. This category also includes indicators measuring the independence of the 
media. 
Average 
Institutions -1.43 -1.08 -1.04 It is taken as the simple average of all six indicators over the period. 
Transparency International  
Corruption 
Perception 
Index 0.69 1.2 2.7 
It is calculated by Transparency International and is measured as 0 (high corruption) 
and 10 (no corruption). 
Heritage Foundation Freedom Indices** 
Investment 
Freedom 70 70 30 
This factor scrutinizes each country’s policies toward foreign investment, as well as its 
policies toward capital flows internally. 
Financial 
Freedom 30 30 40 
The financial freedom factor measures the relative openness of each country’s banking 
and financial system. 
Property 
Rights 50 30 30 
This factor scores the degree to which a country's laws protect private property rights 
and the degree to which its government enforces those laws. 
* All the indicators of the World Bank ranges between -2.5 to 2.5 with higher score measures better outcomes. 
**The indices of Heritage Foundation ranges between 0 to 100, with higher score indicates greater freedom. 
 
    
   
  
